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Combatting physical threats posed via digital means: the European 
Commission’s developing approach to the sale of counterfeit goods on 
the Internet 
 
Dr Benjamin Farrand, School of Law, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, 
United Kingdom 
b.farrand@warwick.ac.uk  
 
The purpose of this paper is to trace the development of the EU’s policies regarding the 
combatting of counterfeiting and in particular the establishment of the European 
Observatory on Counterfeiting and Piracy (later renamed the European Observatory on 
Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights).  This paper will demonstrate how ‘hard’ 
legal regimes for the management of online sales of counterfeit items have been 
significantly limited by the lack of effective data on the scale of the phenomenon, as well as 
the reluctance of Internet platforms to tackle online infringements.  Through the 
empowerment of the Observatory and its transferal to the European agency the Office of 
Harmonisation of the Internal Market (OHIM) however, the EU has managed to establish 
its position as a cyber-security actor able to tackle online infringements of intellectual 
property rights.  Through research into and identification of best practices concerning the 
quantification of counterfeit sales, information collection and sharing, and in facilitating 
coordination and cooperation between networks of private and public sector actors, the 
Observatory has taken on a key role in establishing online networks for proactively 
countering the sale and distribution of counterfeit products online.  In this way, the 
Commission’s facilitation of a network governance model has led to the development of a 
more effective means of combatting the threat posed by physical goods that are 
distributed via digital means. 
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Introduction 
 
One field in which the EU expanded its competence as a cyber-security actor is that of 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights by tackling trademark infringements 
taking place online.  Originally concerned with efforts to facilitate the completion of the 
internal market, the EU’s trademark policies have increasingly focused upon concerns 
over the security threats posed by the importation of illegal counterfeit goods into the 
EU, and in particular, the use of the Internet as the means for this illicit trade.  However, 
the use of ‘hard’ regulatory approaches to this problem, in the form of legislation 
seeking to curtail illicit conduct such as the E-Commerce Directive and Enforcement 
Directive, and expanding EU competences to tackle the online sale of counterfeits by 
means of international agreements such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 
have had limited success; as a result, the Commission has focused upon alternative 
means of tackling the online counterfeiting trade.  In particular, the Commission has 
sought to establish itself as a centre of expertise in this field, establishing the European 
Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights (hereafter the 
Observatory) as a means of identifying and sharing data on enforcement and best 
practices, as well as facilitating networks of private sector actors in proactively 
combatting the trade of counterfeit goods online.  This article will demonstrate the 
means by which the EU has sought to supplement its ‘hard’ legal regime with ‘soft’ 
information gathering, cooperation and coordination mechanisms, highlighting the 
difficulties in establishing legal regimes for combatting the sale of counterfeit goods 
online, as well as how the Observatory has been established as a key actor in the 
management of online trademark infringements.   
 
According to the EU’s Cyber-Security Strategy, cyber-security refers “to the safeguards 
and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and 
military fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may harm its 
interdependent networks and information infrastructure” (2013, p. 3).  Within the field 
of cyber-security, the combatting of cybercrime constitutes a main area of activity 
(Fafinski et al., 2010), complementing actions combatting activities categorised as 
cyber-espionage and cyber-warfare (Grauman, 2012).  According to the EU, cybercrime 
constitutes “a broad range of different criminal activities where computers and 
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information systems are involved either as a primary tool or as a primary target” 
(European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, 2013, p. 3).  For this reason, a more narrow 
conceptualisation of cyber-security that focuses on attacks against network information 
systems, which is particularly common amongst computer engineers and technicians 
(Stevens, 2015, pp. 8–9), misses the broader potential uses of network information 
systems to crimes.  The UK Government, for example, has included the combatting of 
cybercrime as a key component of its own cyber-security strategy, not only concerned 
with protecting infrastructure deemed essential to national security, but also to ensure 
a safe environment for online business transactions, both for commercial actors as well 
as for consumers (HM Government, 2011, pp. 36–38).  Indeed, the perception that 
cybercrime is ‘rife’ on the Internet has been indicated as a key factor impacting business 
and consumer trust and confidence in the use of the Internet, particularly for e-
commerce (Broadhurst, 2006; Smith, 2004), with the EU perceiving combatting criminal 
activity as a key means of increasing “confidence and the enhancement of market 
integrity” (Herlin-Karnell, 2015, p. 54).  The EU takes a similar approach to the issue of 
cybercrime in its Cyber-Security Strategy, noting that “the EU economy is already 
affected by cybercrime activities against the private sector and individuals” (2013, p. 3), 
and that cybercrime poses a significant threat as it “knows no borders” (2013, p. 9).  In 
the 2015 Digital Single Market Strategy, the Commission again reiterates the threat to 
business and consumer confidence presented by illegal activity on the Internet, and 
considers building trust in Internet security, including the combatting of online content 
offences, a priority (European Commission, 2015, pp. 12, 14).  Counterfeiting can 
constitute a form of cybercrime, insofar as the Internet is used as the means of 
advertising the availability of counterfeit goods, and indeed, more easily facilitates their 
distribution.  The EU’s Single Market Act Communication indicated that combatting 
counterfeiting more effectively was to be considered a key policy (2011a, p. 9), within 
the context of a policy agenda intended to ensure sustainable growth in light of the 
financial crisis.  For the EU, counterfeiting and other forms of intellectual property 
infringement deprive “EU creators of appropriate rewards, create barriers to 
innovation, harm competitiveness, destroy jobs, decrease public finances and possibly 
threaten the health and safety of EU citizens” (2011b, p. 17), resulting in protection of 
intellectual property rights being framed as a security issue (see also Farrand and 
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Carrapico, 2012).  One of the means the EU has identified to combat this perceived 
security threat, particularly where it relates to the online facilitation of counterfeit sales, 
is the empowerment of the Observatory (2011a, p. 9), as this article will discuss. 
 
As well as further exploring the role of the EU as a cyber-security actor in the field of 
online distribution of intellectual property-infringing goods, an issue relatively 
unexplored in EU cyber-security literature, this article contributes to the understanding 
of the Observatory and its functions as a regulator, which has received little attention in 
comparison to other EU agencies, with academic literature often doing little more than 
confirming its existence (see for example Acquah, 2015; Falkner, 2013; Geiger, 2012; 
Godart, 2010; Grant, 2012; O’Neill, 2011; Peukert, 2011).  This article therefore 
contributes both to understanding of the EU as a cyber-security actor in the field of 
intellectual property generally, as well as the role of agencies in these activities 
specifically. 
 
Governing through networks: - EU agencies, stakeholder expertise and the 
establishment of the European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
 
The early twenty-first century has seen a proliferation of European agencies.  These EU-
level agencies, argue Trondal and Jeppesen, “contribute to technical and sectoral know-
how […and] is one way for the Commission to control the implementation of community 
regulation […] as well as securing expertise, credibility and visibility” (2008, pp. 417–
418).  This ‘agencification’ of the EU has been claimed to follow similar trends at the 
national level, particularly in Western Europe (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007), and in 
line with dominant beliefs concerning the importance of market liberalisation with 
stakeholder involvement in regulation (Levi-Faur and Jordana, 2005).  As Levi-Faur has 
stated, the development of these agencies must be placed in context; the new regulatory 
model is social, political and economic, based in principles of market efficiency that both 
serve to constitute and moderate the current capitalist system (2005, p. 14).  In this 
‘regulatory capitalism’ framework, the state “retains responsibility for steering, while 
business increasingly takes over the functions of service provision and technological 
innovation […it entails] a restructuring of the state (through delegation and the creation 
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of regulatory agencies)” (Levi-Faur, 2005, p. 15).  According to Cardwell, the principle 
advantages of the use of agencies is their ability to fulfil the need for specialised, 
technical assistance, the implementation of key tasks and their networking role, 
bringing together different regulatory stakeholders (2013, p. 541).  Indeed, the 
Commission appears to subscribe to such a logic, commenting in the 2001 White Paper 
on Governance that the “creation of further autonomous EU regulatory agencies in 
clearly defined areas will improve the way rules are applied and enforced across the 
Union” (European Commission, 2001, p. 23).  Furthermore, according to a 2008 
Commission document, agencies are “part of the institutional landscape of the Union” 
2008, p. 2) and “support the decision-making process by pooling the technical or 
specialist expertise available at European and national level” (2008, p. 2).  So common 
has the use of agencies become in the European regulatory space that one author has 
commented: -  
 
One could even get the impression that for each and every new threat that the 
European Union is faced with (fraud; bio-terrorism; unsafe food; planes falling 
from the sky; chemical attacks; unsafe trains; diseases; illegal fishing; violations 
of human rights; etc.) the first reaction is to set up another Agency (van Ooik, 
2005, p. 126). 
 
Indeed, as of 2015, there are 32 regulatory agencies active in the EU (Egeberg et al., 
2015, p. 615); by way of comparison, in 1999, there were eight, and by 2007, 24 (Levi-
Faur, 2012, p. 33).  Agencies operating within the field of cyber-security are the 
European Union Agency for Network Information Security (ENISA), the European 
Defence Agency, and the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) unit, established under the 
auspices of Europol.   Yet, as this article will demonstrate, while the European 
Observatory also undertakes activities in the offline environment, it nevertheless serves 
to extend the scope of the EU’s capacities as a cyber-security actor through the 
coordination of efforts to counter online infringements of intellectual property rights, 
and in particular, the online sale of counterfeit goods. 
 
In 2008, the Competitiveness Council released Conclusions reiterating that the growth 
of counterfeiting and piracy were particularly worrying, being “aware of the scale of this 
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phenomenon on the Internet” (Council of the European Union, 2008, para. 10).  In order 
to effectively determine the scale of this problem, the Council urged the Commission to 
establish a European counterfeiting and piracy observatory, coordinating with both the 
public and private sectors to gather evidence (2008, para. 15).  Acting on this invitation, 
the Commission released a Communication on enhancing intellectual property 
enforcement in 2009, in which it was stated that along with ratifying ACTA, 
“consolidating public and private sector partnerships is also imperative to […making…] 
IPR enforcement work better […] by complementing legislation with a range of non-
legislative measures” (2009, pp. 4–5).  With regard to the establishment of the 
Observatory, the Commission went further than the Council suggested, stating that it 
would constitute a “platform for representatives from national authorities and 
stakeholders to exchange ideas and expertise on best practices, to develop joint 
enforcement strategies and to make recommendations to policy-makers” (2009, p. 6).  
The Observatory was originally a sub-department of the Commission’s DG Internal 
Market and Services (EU Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights, 
2015), but was subsequently moved to the Office for the Harmonisation of the Internal 
Market (OHIM), a pre-existing agency responsible for the registration of Community 
Trade Marks.  Renamed the Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property 
Rights, the Observatory had its powers expanded under Regulation No 386/2012 
(2012) Article 2, to include not only data gathering and coordination with national 
regulators and interested stakeholders, but also the capacity to make Recommendations 
to the Commission for legal action upon the basis of its findings.  The Regulation is 
particularly useful in identifying the means by which the EU has expanded its capacity 
as a cyber-security actor.  Through repositioning the Observatory as an information-
gathering agency within the structure of OHIM, the EU has sought to establish both 
credibility and expertise concerning the scale of counterfeiting in the EU, including on 
the Internet.  By establishing the Observatory within an agency structure, it helps to 
ensure the resilience of the relationships between public and private actors involved in 
gathering data concerning infringement, through a process of formalisation of roles that 
“bridges the gaps between insulated hierarchies to form a network of stable and 
interdependent relations” (Levi-Faur, 2012, p. 37).   
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The intention to formalise these roles is made clear by recital 23 of the Regulation, 
which states that the Observatory will bring together those private actors “most 
concerned by or most experienced in the fight against infringements of intellectual 
property rights, in particular representatives of right holders, including authors and 
other creators, as well as internet intermediaries”, who are to be responsible for data 
collection and the sharing of best practice under Article 2.  Yet what is counterfeiting, 
and why is it perceived as a problem requiring EU intervention?  In order to better 
understand the EU’s anti-counterfeiting policies and the establishment of the 
Observatory, it is necessary to first provide a brief overview of the intellectual property 
rights affected by counterfeiting, and the underlying rationale for protection.  
Counterfeiting concerns the infringement of an economic undertaking’s trademark.  A 
trademark, under EU law, is considered as being any sign that distinguishes the goods 
or services of an undertaking from those of other undertakings, and include logos, 
phrases, and the shape of goods or their packaging, as indicated by the Trademarks 
Directive (2008/95/EC).  Unlike other forms of intellectual property, such as copyright, 
the rationale for protection is not entirely based on notions of incentive or reward for 
acts of creation (see, for example Bently and Sherman, 2014, pp. 35–40; see also 
Spitzlinger, 2011; Zemer, 2007).  Instead, the original impetus for the protection of 
these signs or identifying marks was based in notions of consumer protection.  As 
Ramirez-Montes argues, the genesis of trademark in the English common law system 
was intended as a means of ensuring that consumers could be assured as to the origin 
and quality of goods, while at the same time protecting the interest of traders in honest 
competition (2010, pp. 92–93).  The initial forays into trademark law by the 
Commission were taken on the basis of achieving internal market harmonisation goals, 
and a desire to ensure that intellectual property rights would not serve as a barrier to 
trade (European Commission, 1976, p. 7).  The resulting legislation therefore served to 
establish a common Community Trade Mark, to be registered at OHIM, with the intent 
that it was to be “confined to fundamental rules, the harmonisation of which was 
deemed indispensable to the completion of the internal market” (Kur, 1997, p. 3).   
 
Nevertheless, measures to protect the market for trademarked goods were being 
developed alongside measures to harmonise the market.  As early as 1985, concerns 
regarding the acts of counterfeiting led to the European Parliament’s Committee on 
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Legal Affairs and Citizens Rights drafting a report (European Parliament, 1985) in 
response to a Commission proposal for a Regulation on counterfeiting (European 
Commission, 1984).  According to this report, counterfeiting was considered to be a 
‘jargon’ term, covering the making and/or selling of products similar to well-known 
products on the market, with the mark or name of the manufacturer of the original 
goods (1985, p. 13) – often linked together with ‘piracy’, the infringement of copyright1.  
The reason for wishing to prevent such conduct was clear – in addition to constituting a 
potential harm to legitimate businesses as well as impacting upon the development of 
the internal market, they were considered as posing “a threat to the health and safety of 
consumers everywhere” (1984, p. 19).  Furthermore, counterfeiting at this time appears 
to have been considered as a problem originating outside of the EU; the proposed 
Regulation intended to provide for a common procedure for preventing the goods 
entering the internal market by means of using custom services to stop counterfeit 
goods from countries such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Brazil at the external 
frontiers of the EEC (1985, pp. 13, 18–19).   
 
The resulting Regulation (1986), however, was considered as having certain 
deficiencies.  In particular, the definition provided for counterfeit goods was considered 
insufficient, including only those “goods bearing without authorization a trade mark” in 
Article 1(2)(a).  The result of this was that goods were being imported without any 
marks, the identifying marks shipped separately, and then affixed subsequent to their 
importation into the EEC (European Commission, 1991, p. 6).  The Commission 
proposed the repeal and replacement of the Regulation with one with a more 
comprehensive definition of counterfeit goods, as well as proposing additional 
improvements to the customs identification and seizure procedures (European 
Commission, 1993).  The resulting Regulation (1994) expands the definition of 
counterfeit goods under Article 1(2)(a) to cover packaging and any trademark symbols, 
including labels, stickers or instructions for use, and which bears “without authorization 
a trade mark which is identical to the trade mark validly registered in respect of the 
                                                     
1 While it is not the main focus of this paper, it is nevertheless important to distinguish between the 
different forms of intellectual property infringement, despite ‘counterfeiting’ and ‘piracy’ often being 
discussed and classified together – in particular, whereas copyright infringement may cause economic 
harm to a right-holder, the significant risks to public health and safety that arise from certain forms of 
counterfeit good are not necessarily existent when considering acts of piracy (see Farrand and Carrapico, 
2012, pp. 395–398) 
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same type of goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from such 
trade mark”.  It is in 1998, however, that the discourse concerning counterfeiting 
becomes one dominated by questions of security (see generally Farrand and Carrapico, 
2012).  In the 1998 Green Paper on counterfeiting and piracy, the Commission states 
that “counterfeiting is also rife in sectors involving products which are highly sensitive 
from the point of view of public health and safety, such as medicinal products, medical 
equipment, toys, and spare parts for cars and aeroplanes” (1998, p. 8).  Subsequently, in 
the 2000 Follow-up document, the Commission announced that “apart from the 
economic and social consequences, the phenomenon [of counterfeiting and piracy] 
appears to be increasingly linked to organised crime and is developing in new ways 
with the Internet” (2000, p. 3).  For this reason, as well as measures taken to improve 
customs enforcement of intellectual property rights, the Commission concluded that 
“given that counterfeiting and piracy on the Internet are a growing cause for concern, 
the Commission intends to keep a close eye on developments and will, if necessary, take 
appropriate initiatives” (2000, p. 5).  As the next two sections of the article will 
demonstrate, however, the EU has faced significant hurdles regarding the management 
of online counterfeit sales, based in a lack of useable data on the phenomenon, and in 
coordinating the action of interested actors in the online environment, two problems 
that the establishment of the Observatory is intended to remedy. 
 
The Observatory as a source of information: - better regulation through better 
evidence provision 
 
The Commission has found that assessing the impact of the online sale of counterfeits 
upon the internal market is a difficult and indeed unenviable task.  Referring back to the 
1998 Green Paper that launched the EU’s anti-online counterfeiting policies, the 
Commission admitted that the scale was difficult to estimate, and the impact difficult to 
quantify (1998, p. 10).  In the Follow-up, the Commission reiterated that the exact 
economic impact of the activity was unknown, but noted that “interested parties” 
estimated the combined impact of counterfeiting and piracy to be “€200 to €300 billion 
a year and with global losses of 200,000 jobs a year” (2000, p. 4).  However, this figure 
has been subject to substantial criticism due to its inaccuracy (see for example Sanchez, 
2008 on the origins of these, and similar figures), as well as its unquestioned use by 
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policy-makers as a basis for legislative action (Farrand, 2014) and the blurring of the 
boundaries of copyright infringement and trademark infringement, masking both the 
different economic values of each activity and the potential consumer harm (Farrand 
and Carrapico, 2012; see also Heinonen et al., 2014; Sullivan et al., 2014).  In its 2008 
Conclusions (mentioned above) the Competitiveness Council, perhaps aware of the 
concerns regarding the validity and reliability of data on online infringements, 
commented that the Observatory could serve to ensure “a more precise analysis of these 
phenomena” (2008, para. 15), and in 2009 the Commission subsequently noted that one 
of the biggest challenges in this field was the collection of valid data, and that due to 
data being held by a myriad of national enforcement bodies, intellectual property offices 
and private sector corporations, any held data on the economic impact of online 
counterfeit sales was often “difficult to assimilate” (2009, p. 5). 
 
Nevertheless, despite concerns expressed regarding the reliability and validity of 
economic data, the potential risks of counterfeit goods and the fact that they are being 
advertised and distributed through the Internet, are considered readily apparent by 
stakeholders and EU agencies such as Europol.  In their provocatively titled report ‘The 
Counterfeiting Superhighway’, the European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines 
(EAASM) argued that in a test performed, 36 medicines were bought from online, non-
verified ‘pharmacies’, with laboratory analysis finding that over 62% of medicines 
tested were either counterfeit, substandard or unapproved generic medicines (2008, p. 
27).  The EAASM also estimated that 1% of medicines sold in the EU were counterfeit, 
representing 7 million prescriptions in the UK alone, and that “the Internet, now fairly 
ubiquitous in Europe though poorly regulated with regard to buying medicines, 
represents a major loophole through which counterfeit medicines can reach consumers” 
(2008, p. 11).  Similarly, Johnson and Johnson raised concerns regarding the sale over 
an ineffectively regulated Internet of both counterfeit medicines and counterfeit contact 
lenses implicated in a number of serious eye infections and damage to vision (2011, p. 
3).  According to Europol’s ‘Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment’ (SOCTA) 
report from 2013, 28.6% of all goods seized at EU borders constituted counterfeit goods 
posing a direct risk to health and safety, covering “foods and beverages, body care 
articles, medicines, electrical household items and toys” (2013, p. 22).  In the Proposal 
for the above-mentioned Enforcement Directive, the Commission commented 
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“counterfeiting and piracy, which were once craft activities, have become almost 
industrial-scale activities.  They offer criminals the prospect of large economic profit 
without excessive risk” (2003, p. 12), particularly on the Internet, where identification 
of infringers was considered highly difficult, further reducing the risks for alleged 
counterfeiters (2003, p. 12).  Counterfeiting, as discussed above, was not deemed new in 
the early 21st Century, and indeed European states and the US had raised concerns 
about mass-scale counterfeiting in industrialising nations in the 1970s and 1980s, with 
the US linking the issue of intellectual property protection to that of global trade (see for 
example Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002), mandating the ‘Special 301 Report’ system, in 
which states deemed to not give proper effect to intellectual property rights may be 
subject to trade sanctions (Farrand and Carrapico, 2012).  What was perceived as new 
was the use of the Internet as the means of facilitating the distribution of counterfeit 
goods – the trade of physical goods posing potential health risks as well as, a significant 
threat to the economy by the use of digital network communications technologies.  
There is evidence to suggest that online marketing of counterfeit goods is not solely 
limited to sophisticated and highly technical activities such as the establishment of 
online pharmacy-imitating websites, but also includes a more ‘mundane’ transition of 
offline activities to the online environment (Treadwell, 2012, p. 176).  At the local level, 
Treadwell argues, the Internet auction (such as that facilitated by eBay) has to an extent 
supplanted the ‘car boot sale’ as the means for selling ‘knock-off’ goods, with low level 
criminal activity not directly linked to the sale of safety critical or organised crime-
related counterfeits (2012, pp. 180–181).  According to the sellers of counterfeit 
merchandise online interviewed by Treadwell, “the Internet is the perfect vehicle for 
such transactions and all [interviewed participants] commented on how easily the 
Internet facilitates low risk forms of crime” (2012, p. 185).  The combination of relative 
anonymity and the sheer volume of transactions taking place on websites such as eBay 
led the interviewed participants to consider the activities as largely risk free, appearing 
to confirm the concerns of the Commission regarding the implications of the Internet for 
the distribution of counterfeit goods.  Of particular concern is that online transactions 
facilitate the transfer of ‘small consignments’ – packages sent directly to individual 
buyers in the EU containing the counterfeit items rather than large shipping containers 
full of thousands of goods for subsequent marketing and distribution within the EU.  For 
customs officials, online purchases of counterfeit goods creates a considerable problem 
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– “the massive flow of packages containing infringing goods poses a serious challenge, 
because of their sheer quantity, as well as their ability to blend into the mass of postal 
packages” (Schneider and Maillefer, 2015, p. 263).  Given the difficulties in identifying 
these goods in transit and upon arrival at the EU’s external borders, the quantities of 
such goods reaching the internal market has been difficult to ascertain.  This substantial 
lack of information in turn has led to difficulties in the combatting of such 
infringements.  In this way, the online sale of counterfeit goods can be considered a 
cyber-security in two key ways.  The first is that the sale of counterfeits online, a form of 
cybercrime, impacts upon network security insofar as it leads to a decrease in consumer 
and business confidence in the use of the Internet for online transactions, deemed to be 
of high importance in ensuring the competitiveness of the EU as an economic area 
(European Commission, 2015, pp. 13–14).  The second is that through the sale online of 
goods posing a significant health threat to EU consumers, the Internet is used as the 
means of engaging in illegal activity presenting a threat to the physical security of 
individuals (Leontiadis and Hutchings, 2015; Mackey and Liang, 2013). 
 
Action at the EU level was therefore justified on the grounds that acts of counterfeiting 
and piracy, which by their nature take place on a global scale and disregard national 
borders, cannot be effectively tackled at a local or national level due to insufficient 
information and expertise, necessitating coordinated EU responses (Council Regulation, 
2012, recital 25).  Upon its establishment, the Observatory quickly solidified its position 
as an information repository for the combatting of intellectual property infringements, 
facilitating information exchange between the national and European levels.  The 
Observatory describes itself as being “a network of experts and specialist stakeholders” 
(2015), comprising representatives from both the public and private sector.  Of 
particular relevance to this article, the Observatory has also established specific 
working groups on IP in the Digital World, and the use of economics and statistics as a 
means of ensuring more robust methodologies for the identification of the harms of 
counterfeiting (2015).  One of the first actions of the Observatory upon its 
establishment was to gather legal experts from the private sector in order to better 
understand the different approaches to both countering and quantifying counterfeiting 
in the EU.  A report compiled in 2010 provided an overview of identified best practices 
and provided recommendations to national enforcement agencies and private 
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stakeholders, including means of identifying alleged counterfeiters operating on the 
Internet for the purposes of injunctions, and initiation of legal action (European 
Observatory on Counterfeiting and Piracy, 2010, pp. 3–5).  In its 2013 Work 
Programme, the Observatory stated that it would act as an information coordinating 
body, working with the Commission’s DG TAXUD to compile effective data on 
intellectual property infringements, as well as establishing a methodology and online 
reporting tool for SMEs to log infringements of trademarks and an “information 
exchange system to make information, including that from rights holders, available to 
enforcement related authorities” (2013, pp. 21–23).  The Observatory has continued to 
cement its position as an expert body through the compiling of reports on other 
dimensions of intellectual property infringement, including its 2015 situation report co-
written with Europol, in which it stated that there was a need for concerted action by 
public sector and private industry actors online, due to the fact that “the internet is the 
most significant enabler for the distribution of counterfeit goods, because of […] its 
ability to operate across various jurisdictions, and its potential for presenting 
sophisticated replicas of official web shops” (2015, p. 5).  By acting as a data gatherer, a 
point of contact for national bodies and private sector actors to share information on 
infringement practices, and then publishing reports on counterfeiting, the Observatory 
seeks to provide the EU with a repository for technical know-how and expertise that can 
then serve to reinforce the position of the EU as an actor in this field.  As the subsequent 
section will demonstrate, however, the effectiveness of the Observatory equally applies 
to improving online enforcement as well as data gathering. 
 
The Observatory as a network regulator: - mitigating problems of coordination 
and cooperation online 
 
Responding to the new means of committing traditional content-related crimes 
facilitated by computer technologies, the EU moved quickly to set up a legal framework 
for the removal of illegal content online, including information pertaining to counterfeit 
items on the Internet.  The E-Commerce Directive (2000) provides for the limitation of 
liability for ISPs and online intermediaries under Articles 12-14, so long as  they do not 
initiate, modify or select the recipient of a data transmission in the case of an ISP, or fail 
to act to remove illegal content or limit illegal activity when it is brought to their 
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attention in the case of online intermediaries.  As Julia-Barcelo and Koelman wrote at 
the time of the passing of the directive, as well as covering the distribution of illegal 
materials such as child abuse media and defamatory statements, it was intended that 
this Directive also be used to combat copyright and trademark infringements (2000, p. 
231).  According to Swartout (2011), the role of the service provider became 
understood as a ‘passive’ one; Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive clearly provides 
that Member States shall not impose a general obligation upon internet intermediaries 
“to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation 
actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity”.  Similarly, the 
Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive (2004) provides for injunctions 
under Article 11, preventing an alleged perpetrator from continuing in an act of 
infringement.  However, this legal regulation has not been considered as particularly 
effective at countering infringements of trademarks online.  This was addressed by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the case of L’Oreal v eBay (2011).  In this case, L’Oreal 
was concerned by the number of infringing goods available from sellers on the eBay 
service, including goods that were considered as counterfeits bearing L’Oreal’s 
trademarks (2011, paras. 32–35).  L’Oreal argued that while eBay did take some 
measures in order to combat the selling on infringing and counterfeit goods, more could 
be done, and that even if the trademark infringements were not being committed by 
eBay itself but by its users, an injunction to prevent future infringements should 
nevertheless be placed against eBay under Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive 
(2011, paras. 43–48).  The ECJ disagreed, concluding first that eBay could rely upon 
Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive to ensure its immunity from liability, but only 
where it acts judiciously to remove infringing content upon becoming aware of its 
existence – if actively searching for infringements, the service provider would then be 
obliged to remove such content once discovered, but would not be required to do so if 
taking a passive role and only removing content when asked to do so (C-324/09, 2011, 
para. 124).  Secondly, it concluded that an injunction to prevent future infringements 
under Article 11 may not in itself be unreasonable, but when read in line with Article 15 
of the E-Commerce Directive, the measure 
 
cannot consist in an active monitoring of all the data of each of its customers in 
order to prevent any future infringement of intellectual property rights via that 
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provider’s website […and that] furthermore, a general monitoring obligation 
would be incompatible with Article 3 of Directive 2004/48, which states that the 
measures referred to by the directive must be fair and proportionate and must 
not be excessively costly. (2011, para. 139) 
 
For this reason, while an injunction could not be imposed to prevent all future 
infringements by all users, it could nevertheless require eBay to suspend or terminate 
the accounts of specific, identified infringers (2011, para. 141).  While providing 
internet intermediaries with clear guidance on what is required of them in order to 
avoid liability for infringements of intellectual property rights by the users of their 
services (Rizzuto, 2012, p. 15; Savola, 2014, p. 120), Clark and Schubert have argued 
that the decision has made the position of trademark holders unclear.  This ambiguity 
may result in platforms such as eBay taking a passive role to infringements using their 
services, only acting to remove such content when it was brought to their attention, as a 
means of ensuring they can rely upon immunity from liability (2011, p. 887).  As a 
result, trademark holders are strongly of the opinion that the legal framework currently 
in place does little to tackle infringement on the Internet generally, or counterfeiting 
specifically (Farrand, 2014, p. 47).  By way of example, the Commission ran a public 
consultation on the effectiveness of the E-Commerce Directive from August to 
November 2011, which received over 420 responses, including from firms with 
significant trademarked assets.  Luxury brand company Louis Vuitton stated that the 
intermediary immunity from liability provisions were allowing services such as online 
auction websites to abdicate from any responsibility to regulate their websites, 
providing “an opportunity for illicit practices online to grow, harming consumers and 
businesses in the process”, allowing counterfeiters and organised crime to flourish on 
the Internet (2011, p. 25).   
 
It became readily apparent that the Commission’s legal actions in this field were not 
sufficient to manage the threat posed by the online sale of counterfeit items.  Indeed, 
this perception was shared by the Commission, as indicated in its Proposal for a 
Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in which it was stated that 
up until the early 2000s, “action taken by the Community in the field of intellectual 
property has focused mainly on the harmonisation of national substantive law or the 
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creation of a unitary right at Community level” (2003, p. 4).  The Enforcement Directive, 
albeit intended to effectively counter infringements of intellectual property rights 
including (but not limited) to those actions taken on the Internet, was ultimately 
deemed ineffective.  This issue was recognised by the Commission in a 2009 
Communication on enhancing the protection of intellectual property rights.  In 
particular, the Commission noted that despite the implementation of the Directive, the 
Internet was still being used to “drive a worldwide market in infringing products, which 
is stifling innovation and threatening jobs” (2009, p. 3).  In its subsequent 2010 Review 
of the Directive’s application, the Commission stated that new business sectors such as 
online auction sites and pharmacies was leading to an “unprecedented increase in 
opportunities to infringe intellectual property rights offered by the Internet.  The 
Directive was not designed with this challenge in mind” (2010, p. 2).  The Enforcement 
Directive, while providing for injunctions against intermediaries to prevent 
infringement subject to a court order under Article 11, did not otherwise place 
additional or proactive blocking requirements upon online intermediaries.  In this 
report, the Commission stressed the importance of both Internet Service Providers 
(who provide Internet access to subscribers) and online intermediaries, such as search 
engines and auction sites, as essential actors in the identification and removal of content 
pertaining to the sale of counterfeit goods (2010, pp. 6–7). In the view of the 
Commission, given their “favourable position to contribute to the prevention and 
termination of online infringements, [we] could explore how to involve them more 
closely” (2010, p. 7).   
 
However, efforts to achieve this result through formal and legally binding rules have 
proven to be unsuccessful.  In the Single Market Act Communication, the Commission 
stated that the provision of online services for digital media “must be accompanied by 
European legislation to combat piracy and counterfeiting more effectively” (2011a, p. 
9), to be achieved through the ratification of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), a plurilateral trade treaty between nations such as the US, Japan and Canada. 
ACTA was intended to ensure a reduction in infringements committed in third nations, 
as well as ensuring the cooperation of intermediaries in managing online infringements 
(2011b, p. 20).  Under ACTA Article 27(3), states party to the Agreement would 
“endeavour to promote cooperative efforts within the business community to effectively 
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address trademark and copyright or related rights infringement”.  However, highly-
mediatized protests by European citizens both over the content of ACTA, and their 
belief that the Agreement would lead to both censorship and state surveillance of the 
Internet as a result of Article 27, in addition to the threat of mass criminalisation of end 
users (Farrand, 2015, pp. 508–510), led to the European Parliament’s position shifting 
from one of support for ACTA to one of opposition.  Ultimately, ACTA was rejected in a 
vote by the European Parliament, and as of 2015, the Agreement is considered to be 
moribund, with only Japan having ratified it.  As of the time of writing, there have been 
no further legal attempts to impose liability or an obligation on Internet intermediaries 
to proactively manage the sale of counterfeits on their platforms. 
 
The rejection of ACTA by the European Parliament indicates the limited success that the 
EU has had in combatting the sale of counterfeit goods by way of the Internet through 
‘purely’ legal means.  In particular, it has resulted in a re-evaluation of law-making 
practices at the level of Commission, as evidenced by the clear statement with regard to 
the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), where the Commission 
reiterated that “TTIP will not foresee any harmonisation of rules on enforcement and it 
will not bring back any controversial provisions of ACTA” (Cirlig, 2014, p. 27).  
Furthermore, penal reform and the role of online intermediaries in combatting 
counterfeiting is explicitly outside of the remit of negotiations (Cirlig, 2014, p. 28).  An 
interesting development that has occurred at the level of the EU is the promotion of an 
alternative means of regulation to combat Internet-based counterfeit sales.  As opposed 
to the establishment of legally binding enforcement mechanisms, the Commission has 
instead sought to use agency and network relationships as a means of ensuring online 
compliance with intellectual property protection requirements.  The EU has further 
established its position as an intellectual property-related cyber-security actor through 
the creation and coordination of specialised networks for the ‘informal’ enforcement of 
intellectual property rights online.  Informal, in this context, refers to informal rules and 
procedures that are not enshrined in law and do not have legal force, with the result 
that ‘enforcement’ is also informal and operates outside of official channels (Helmke 
and Levitsky, 2004, p. 727; Stacey, 2013, p. 396).  This approach may be adopted for two 
key reasons – the first, that there may be some fields where formal competences do not 
exist or the formalisation of such rules through legislation is difficult to achieve 
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(Heisenberg, 2013, p. 379; Kleine, 2013, pp. 3–7), or alternatively, where the informal 
inclusion of interested stakeholders may lead to the infusion of a process with increased 
legitimacy or effectiveness (Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004). The tackling of counterfeiting 
online through legal means has not been particularly successful, as discussed in the 
previous section, in part as a result of the inability to implement legislation due to 
concerns regarding both the competence and scope of Commission action.  Instead, 
under the auspices of the Observatory, acting in a supporting and coordinating role 
(European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights, 2014, p. 25), 
the Commission has facilitated a network of actors engaging in voluntary regulation by 
means of coordinated action, comprising Internet intermediaries working together with 
affected industries.  Of particular importance to this strategy was the Memorandum of 
Understanding signed in May 2011, signed with the intent that it would constitute a 
code of best practices for online platforms such as eBay, on the basis that these 
intermediaries are perceived as best placed to manage such infringements and that “the 
sale of counterfeit goods online presents a threat to all stakeholders” (2011c, p. 1).  
Under this Memorandum, signed by parties including eBay, Lacoste, Adidas and Nike, 
rather than relying upon court actions and the E-Commerce Directive in order to 
remove infringing content, intermediaries are expected to proactively identify and 
remove (for example) auction items, where those goods are deemed to be counterfeit 
(2011c, p. 5), act to temporarily or permanently suspend the accounts of repeat 
infringers (2011c, p. 6) and cooperate with customs and enforcement-related bodies in 
the investigation of alleged sales of counterfeit goods (2011c, p. 7).  In particular, these 
methods are intended as a ‘supply side’ measure, impeding the transfer of goods that 
arrive in the EU by way of small consignments by preventing the sale of the counterfeit 
goods, rather than a ‘demand side’ measure typified by seizing purchased goods at the 
point of customs.  In exchange, the Memorandum provides for a moratorium on 
litigation relating to alleged infringements being brought against online intermediaries 
(2011c, p. 2).  A Report on the functioning of the Memorandum by the Commission 
published in 2013 commented that it considered it to be highly effective, with increased 
communication between interested stakeholders (2013, p. 8), and that the rate of 
proactive removal of infringing content on one platform had almost doubled and that 
more than 8,600 accounts linked to the sale of counterfeit items were blocked or 
severely restricted (2013, p. 15).  Due to its success, the Commission proposed 
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extending the Memorandum until 2017, as well as extending its membership (2013, pp. 
16–17).  The Observatory, the Commission noted, would play a useful role in the further 
spreading of the best practices established under the Memorandum, as well as assisting 
“non-signatory Internet Platforms and Rights Owners to adapt their business processes” 
(2013, p. 17).  By establishing the Observatory as a point of contact, as well as 
facilitating soft mechanisms for voluntary regulation by networked actors operating on 
the Internet, the Commission has been further able to increase the effectiveness of 
online management of counterfeit sales, as well as expand its competences as a cyber-
security actor. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The sale of counterfeit items in the EU has been further facilitated by the ability of 
alleged infringers to sell their wares directly to end users on the Internet through 
platforms such as web auction sites, making the identification and seizure of such goods 
more difficult.  Indeed, as this paper has discussed, the ability of national authorities to 
individually counter such actions is significantly limited, and hard legal responses to the 
phenomenon have been equally ineffective.  The agencification of cyber-security 
through the empowerment of the European Observatory, however, has allowed for the 
EU to establish itself as an actor in this field, by instituting it as a centre for information 
concerning the quantity and impact of online counterfeit sales, as well as sharing best 
practices and technical expertise in combatting such infringements with private and 
public sector actors throughout the EU.  Furthermore, by establishing soft mechanisms 
of governance such as the Memorandum of Understanding, the EU has successfully 
managed to bring somewhat reluctant Internet platforms into a proactive enforcement 
regime, facilitating coordination, cooperation and information exchange in such a way 
as to counteract the limitations of the E-Commerce Directive.   
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